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Among those few theological thinkers
that dominate the contemporary scene,
probably none commands a wider hearing
than Emil Brunner. Dr. Brunner lectures
to crowded halls of students in Switzer
land's largest university, the University of
Zurich. Of medium stature, with silver
gray hair and a brisk step, he enters the
room clad in the inevitable dark suit, notes
in hand. As the door slams behind him, the
babel of languages�the Swiss themselves
speak fifty languages when their dialects
are counted, and Brunner's classes are in
ternational gatherings�ceases and the
little professor mounts to the podium amid
the stomping of approving feet and the lec
ture begins.
A great deal has been written not only
by Brunner, but also about him. For all
that, for many American students of theo
logy, there still attaches confusion to the
question of just what Brunner believes.
This situation may no doubt be attributed
in part to the fact that many of the sources
are in German. A much more significant
factor, however, is the very complexity of
the new theology. In this article we shall
illustrate what we mean, concerning our
selves with a special problem, the fall of
man, as this problem took shape in a con
troversy between Ludwig Kohler, a pro
fessor of Old Testament, and Emil Brun
ner.
Though this discussion transpired in
1926, only two years after Brunner had
stepped into the front ranks of theological
controversy with the firing of his first big
gun. Die Mystik und das Wort,' the ma
terial is harmonious with his latest
thoughts on this very crucial matter.
Prof. Kohler, Brunner's colleague on the
theological faculty of Zurich, precipitated
'Tiibingen, 1924. Translated as Mysticism and
the Word.
the debate when he published an article on
the fall of Adam which appeared in a re
ligious paper sponsored by the Reformed
church of German Switzerland.* An old
school liberal, Kohler argued the story of
the fall has as its purpose the explanation
of phenomena of experience naturally in
triguing to the primitive mind, as, why the
snakes have no legs, why thistles grow,
why women have pain at childbirth, why
people wear clothes, etc. The myth of the
fall never played any significant role in
the religion of the Old Testament or in
Judaism even down to the time of Jesus.
It came into its own with Paul, for whom
it is not only history, but along with the
death of Christ, the most important event
in history. The fall is no mere speculation
for Paul. Adam is not simply a type of hu
manity. Rather, for him, the fall of Adam
is one of two foci of the ellipse of the sal
vation event. If one cancel it out, Paul's en
tire structure falls to the ground. (Kohler
is thinking of course of Paul's federal the
ology in Romans 5.) The same applies,
mutatis mutandis, to the Reformers. He is
therefore thankful that he can see in Paul-
inism only one of many attempts in the
New Testament to bring the saving work
of Jesus to him who is eager for salvation.
Brunner replied to this article in a sub
sequent number of the same paper.' He
complained of the irreverent manner in
which Kohler had handled the Genesis
narrative as though it were a fairy tale.
Kohler, he affirmed, was virtually joking
away a thought-entity that had had a fun
damental place in the thought of the faith
of the greatest spiritual leaders of the
West, from Augustine to Pascal and
*Ludwig Kohler, "Die Geschichte vom Siinden-
fall," Kirchenblatt fur die reformierte Sckweie.
(July 8, 1926), 105 ff.
�Emil Brunner, "Die Erde Dreht Sich, Eine
Erwiderung," op. cii.. (July 22, 1926), 113 ff.
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Soren Kierkegaard. As for his part, Brun
ner was happy to take the lowest seat with
the novices around the large table, at the
head of which sat Paul, the great teacher,
who instructed mankind concerning this
history of the Fall as concerning something
which involves all in a most urgent way.
But then comes the remarkable sidestepp
ing. Brunner proceeds to read the account
in Genesis 3 existentially, and even goes
on to say that was the way Paul and the
Reformers read it. "They (viz., Paul and
the Reformers) speak of the status inte-
griatis, where death and sin were not, and
salvation where death and sin will no more
be .... It is this condition so completely
other than what we know" with which they
are concerned" (p. 115). "Hence they are
speaking of that which lies before the his
torical world begins this side of the primal
state as the result of the fall. �" (115). Like
wise the revelation in Christ and the second
coming of Christ are the suspension of that
which followed upon the fall (p. 114).
This is held to be the meaning with
Paul, as well as with the Reformers, of this
"myth." Hence it is not a matter of "some
thing historical," but of the fatal beginn
ing and the glorious overcoming of his
tory through the mercy and power of God.
The writer of Genesis, then, is answering
a truly existential question, the question of
the origin of our present historical exis
tence in distinction to the primeval state
which was created good by God. The an
swer which the writer of the fall narrative
gives to the question of our present his
torical existence is entirely different from
anything found in philosophy or religion.
It is because man disobeyed God, wished
to be as God to know good and evil, that
we now sustain all the miseries of this life
and death itself. An historical event is not
reported here (Genesis 3) but here the
"event" which first caused history, ,viz.
our sinful history, laden with the curse
and death, to begin before the gates of
paradise, is spoken of in a childlike and
simple way. This says Brunner, is by far
the profoundest insight we have into the
ground riddle of our existence. "It re
quires no allegorical exegetical art to see
this, but on the contrary, the most extra
ordinary blindness not to see it." (114)
Brunner catches up Kohler's statement
that no Old Testament scholar of repute
would today defend the history of the fall,
and rejoins that in the "region in which
Genesis 3 and Romans 5 move, the pro
fessional Old Testament scholar as such
has nothing to seek." "Precisely because
the narrative clearly has the character of
a myth, therefore it is not in the area in
which the historian as such is competent."
"If the believer meant by the fall some
thing which took place on the plane of
time-space events which are accessible to
the historian, he would, to be sure, as has
often been the case, fall into a conflict with
science." (pp. 115-116)
Kohler proceeded to reply to Brunner
briefly,* but pointedly, that all of Brunner s
acute dialectic did not alter the simple fact
that for Paul the fall as well as the sub
sequent history of man were straight his
tory. Paul knew nothing of the dimension
al difference between primal history and
time-space history. A pastor, P. Marti,
threw his hat into the ring with the ob
servation that it would take gnostic illu
mination not to see that for Paul, creation,
fall, the reign of sin and death, the law,
Christ and the restoration all occur on the
same time-space plane."
This forced Brunner in a final rebuttal
to face a bit more squarely." All this
harangue, said he, about the fact that the
fall was for Paul historical was beside the
point. That objection was valid only a-
gainst the verbal-inspij-ation view. Un
doubtedly for the Jehovist, as well as for
Paul and the Reformers, the fall was
something which really happened 4000
years ago. That is to say, the form given
the idea of the fall is that of an "histori
cal occurrence." No doubt Paul when he
spoke of heaven and the heavenlies thought
in terms of the three-story structure of
*L. Kohler, "Replik," op. cit., (Aug. 5, 1926),
121 ff.
"P. Marti, "Und Sie bewegt Sich Doch, Eine
Antwort," op. cit., (Aug. 12, 1926), 125 flF.
�E. Brunner, "Duplik," op. cii., (Sept. 9, 1926),
141 ff.
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Babylonian cosmology, as did everyone in
antiquity. Must we then abandon the idea
of heaven? Brunner even waxes prophetic.
By the year 3000 our present world view
will be as outmoded as that of the ancients
now is.
Yet no one can give expression to the
thoughts of his faith without involvement
in his view of the universe. What can be
said of Paul and his Babylonian astronomy
will prove true of Copernicus and Darwin.'
The tension of Brunner's yes-no dialectic
comes to focus when he proclaims.
Just as it is vital to me that a heaven exists�
the heaven of which Paul speaks, in spite of the
fact that he always, whenever he speaks of it,
also speaks of that one which does not exist, i.e.,
the Babylonian glass-bell, so also it is vital to me
from the standpoint of faith <md dogma, that
creation and the fall really happened, in spite of
the fact that I know that they did not so happen
(as to time, place) as Genesis 3, Paul, and the
Reformers supposed.'
The great error of the Enlightenment,
concludes Brunner, was to suppose that
world view and religious faith could not
be separated, the loss of the form involved
the loss of the idea.
It becomes evident in this second article
that the status integriates is not quite as
"absolutely other" for Paul and the Refor
mers as Brunner affirmed at first. The fall
was not, for them as for Brunner, some
thing beyond and before history, but rather
in history. But if for Paul, the fall was an
event on the calendar, it would seem to
have interesting implications. A. Schlat
ter once observed' that the science of an
thropology has greatly expanded the time
between the beginning of human origins
and critical history. Brunner laments that
Schlatter confused the existential "whence"
(IVoher) with the causal-metaphysical
one.'" Would not the same apply to Paul,
'The polemical context probably explains this
overstatement. Presumably the heliocentric uni
verse will not suffer the fate of the geocentric.
"The process of science is, in spite of all setbacks
in detail, in the main continuous." E. Brunner,
Offenbarung und Vernunft, Zurich, 1941, 358.
"Brunner, Ibid., p. 141.
*Das Christliche Dogma, Stuttgart, 1911, 278.
^"Der Mittler, Tubingen, 1927, footnote, 15,
if he conceived of the fall as an event
within time-space history? But what could
be worse than not thinking at all times
existentially ?
For another thing, one cannot but admire
in a way, the facile movement of Brunner's
thought, by which he moves from the
time-space framework to that which lies
beyond. It would help if we all could have
this mental dexterity. Then we could avoid
such questions as what kind of an event
it might be that does not occur in time and
space. Paul's doctrine is: At a given time
and in a given place, the first man com
mitted a sinful act of transgression against
the will of God. If we remove the time-
space form in which this proposition is
cast, we do not have much left to talk of.
Brunner may speak of the fall as an
"event" in quotes, he may call it primal
history, or even affirm, as he does in one
place, that he "does not know what the fall
is, nor why and how it happened." The
prosaic mind can hardly escape the sus
picion that an event which did not happen
in time and space, did not happen at all.
One final observation is germaine. For
Brunner the revelation in Christ, the
Second Adam, is likewise on the dimension
of primal history, as observed above. It
would seem then definitely to follow that
the historical Jesus is only the form of the
Christ idea and therefore the existence of
Jesus would, qua historical event, be a
matter of indifference to faith. At one
time Barth assented as much" but has now
changed his mind, a privilege which he
exercises quite freely. Brunner, however,
has never even made such a suggestion.
He has rather, from the time of his
classic Christology, Der Mittler," insisted
that the existence of Jesus of Nazareth as
an historical person in time and space is
absolutely essential to Christianity. It is
obvious why he makes this insistence. If
there is no absolute value attaching to the
historical Jesus, then we are back in the
""Frieden auf Erden," Grundriss, (Jan/Feb.
1944), 5 ff.
"cf. Paul Tillich, "What is Wrong with the
Dialectical Theology?", The lournal df Religion,
(April, 1935), 133.
"Tiibingen, 1927, Translated as The Mediator.
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old liberalism, which reduces Jesus to
another religious genius, whose significance
attaches not to his person, but his teach
ing. Had Jesus of Nazareth never lived,
someone else would have discovered even
tually the religious truth which he taught.
To counteract this, Brunner must insist
that the historical Jesus, and not just the
Christ idea, is essential to Christian faith.
But Brunner has never anywhere indicated
how it is possible to existentialize the ex
istence of the first Adam and to hold to
the absolute necessity of the Jesus-event.
It is an ellipse with one focus.
